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1. MTRODUCTION 
Many major decisions in public and pr ivate  a r enas  are delegated to commit- 
tees. The institution of a committee, though i t  has  many shortcomings, remains an  
important aspect  of many decision processes;  t he  process  of committee decision- 
making must therefore  be  improved. A s  a resul t  of personal experiences with com- 
mittees, t h e  au thors  have developed a procedural  concept and an  automated aid 
f o r  decision-making by committee, aimed in par t icular  at a committee charged with 
t he  task of selecting from a finite set of alternatives. 
The theoret ical  framework f o r  the  automated system called "SCDAS" (for  
Selection Committee Decision Analysis and Support system) follows the  concept 
developed by Johnson (1984). The multi-person decision support  system is  based 
on the  construction of an  order-consistent achievement function (Wierzbicki, 1985) 
which is  used as a multivariable cardinal utility function and depends explicitly on 
the  contextual information supplied by the  users.  The system described can b e  ap- 
plied to a wide spectrum of decision problems and serves  as a processor  of infor- 
mation about pre fe rences  and alternatives tha t  guides t he  committee. The comput- 
er implementation i s  non-procedural in tha t  a menu format allows ent ry  and re- 
ent ry  into many s tages  of t he  process,  thus allowing a grea t  deal of procedural  
flexibility. Additionally, a r ich  graphic representation has  proven quite user- 
friendly on t h e  basis of several  empirical tests. 
The organization of the  pape r  is  as follows. First ,  t h e  theoretical background 
and technical aspec ts  of t h e  system are discussed. A section devoted to a discus- 
sion of t h e  procedural framework follows. A tutorial  example of t h e  selection of a 
candidate by a recrui t ing committee is  used throughout f o r  i l lustrative purposes. 
The final section presen ts  in brief t h e  computer implementation of SCDAS and t h e  
limitations and f u r t h e r  extensions of the  system, t he  primary one being the  explicit 
inclusion of uncertainty in t h e  evaluation of alternatives.  
2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
The problem of selecting one alternative from a finite set of alternatives 
presented t o  a committee is one of t he  most basic and classical decision problems 
and has received much attention in t he  decision-theoretical l i terature.  There are 
many detailed variants of such a problem; here ,  w e  consider the  following abs t rac t  
variant: 
A committee consists of several  members (denoted he re  by k = 1. ..., K); each 
member can have e i ther  equal o r  different voting power (denoted h e r e  by a voting 
power coefficient v(k) ) ,  specified a prior i  by the  committee charter .  In addition 
t o  the  committee s t ruc ture ,  the committee c h a r t e r  might specify the  purpose of 
the  committee's work, fu r the r  procedural details, etc.  
The problem faced by the committee is t o  jointly rank o r  select one o r  a f e w  
from a set of available decision al ternat ives  (these might be  candidates f o r  a job, 
proposals f o r  R&D projects,  alternative transportation routes,  proposed sites of 
an  industrial facility, alternative computer systems, etc.). The list of alternatives 
need not be complete at the  beginning of the committee's work; during the 
decision-making process,  new alternatives may be generated and subsequently 
evaluated. 
Evaluation of alternatives i s  performed by the  committee by f i r s t  specifying 
decision a t t r ibutes  (such as a candidate's age, experience, professional reputa- 
tion, etc.)  and then assessing each alternative with respec t  t o  each of these at t r i -  
butes. The list  of decision at t r ibutes  (denoted by j = I,.. , J) might be  specified in 
t he  committee's c h a r t e r  o r  decided upon by the  committee. In any case,  decision 
at t r ibutes  must be specified before alternatives can be evaluated and compared. 
Each alternative (denoted by i = 1, .  . . , I )  must be evaluated by the  committee 
o r  i t s  individual members. The problem consists of proposing a decis ion process 
which together with assessment of various at t r ibutes  of the alternatives and 
aggregation of evaluations across  both at t r ibutes  and committee members, leads t o  
a final ranking o r  selection of an  alternative@) in a way that  is rational, under- 
standable and acceptable t o  the  committee members. 
Several approaches t o  this problem have been developed; most of them a r e  
based on the  classical multi-attribute utility theory (see e.g. Keeney and Raiffa, 
1976), but t he re  are also alternative approaches, such as the  analytical hierarchy 
of Saaty (1982) o r  t he  orderings of Roy (1971). Some of these approaches have 
been also implemented as microcomputer-based decision support systems: an  in- 
teresting implementation i s  tha t  of analytical hierarchy (EXPERT CHOICE, 1983) o r  
the  non-procedural package DEMOS (1982) used f o r  probabilistic evaluation of al- 
ternatives.  Another commercially available implementation (LIGHTYEAR. 1984), 
based on utility theory and weighting coefficients specified by the user ,  employs a 
r a t h e r  primitive decision process and i s  res t r ic ted  t o  only one user ,  hence i t  i s  
not applicable in committee decisions. 
Most of these approaches rely on e i ther  user-supplied rankings of a t t r ibutes  
and alternatives f o r  each at t r ibute ,  pairwise comparisons of alternatives, o r  some 
uncertainty equivalence principle (e.g. comparisons t o  a lottery). The available 
assembly of alternatives plays an  important role  when establishing the  principles 
of t he  decision. Such decision processes will be called alternative-led. An attempt 
t o  establish decision principles independently of available alternatives is possible 
when specifying weighting coefficients by the  user ;  but in addition t o  t he  problem 
of having t o  specify utility functions o r  explicit weighting functions f o r  the  multi- 
ple at t r ibutes ,  weighting coefficients can be reasonably interpreted only locally, 
when the  available alternatives do not differ much in all of the attributes.  When 
the  available alternatives differ significantly in some attributes.  t he  approximate 
linearity of the user 's  utility function is a questionable assumption. 
An easily interpretable  outline of decision principles tha t  are independent of 
available alternatives is possible when requiring each member t o  specify aspira- 
tion and (or) reservation levels f o r  t he  evaluation of each attribute.  Such a pro- 
cess  will be  called aspiration-Led. The concept of a n  aspiration level i s  essential 
fo r  the  sa t i s f i c ing  framework of decision-making (Simon, 1958). where i t  is  as- 
sumed tha t  as soon as an  alternative is discovered tha t  meets aspiration levels fo r  
all at t r ibutes ,  t h e  search  f o r  alternatives is terminated and the  choice is made. 
However, w e  do not adhere  h e r e  t o  the  strictly satisficing framework: aspiration 
levels are used r a t h e r  in t he  construction of a n  approximate multivariable cardi- 
nal utility function tha t  is fu r the r  averaged and maximized in t he  system. This ap- 
proach is called quas i sa t i s f i c ing  (see Wierzbicki, 1985). 
The reservation level represents  a minimum acceptable level f o r  each at t r i -  
bute (e.g. minimum 5 years '  experience f o r  the  position), whereas a n  aspiration 
level ref lects  a higher desired level of expertise.  If an  alternative is evaluated 
below the  reservation level on even one at t r ibute ,  i t  i s  considered unacceptable, 
and if i t  is  evaluated at least equal t o  aspiration levels fo r  a l l  a t t r ibutes ,  i t  is  con- 
sidered highly desirable. Nonlinear approximations of utility functions based on 
aspiration (reservation) levels supplied by the  user  a r e  called (order-consistent, 
o r  order-preserving and representing) achievement f u n c t i o n s  and have been stu- 
died in detail by Wierzbicki (1982, 1985). Johnson (1984) has worked out a concept 
f o r  a selection committee decision analysis and support system based on 
committee-supplied aspiration levels and the  use of achievement functions f o r  both 
alternative-led and aspiration-led variants of the  decision process; however, only 
the latter is  chosen h e r e  f o r  implementation. 
2-1. Setting and discussing aspirations 
An aspiration-led decision process has  several  advantages. Most judgmental 
decision processes requi re  a choice of (and, in a committee, agreement upon) 
scales of evaluation f o r  each decision at t r ibute  . The scales are often qualitative, 
such as unacceptable, bad, acceptable,  good. very good, excellent, though they 
can be  transformed into quantitative scales f o r  computational purposes. When 
asked t o  specify a n c h o r  p o i n t s  (aspiration and reservation levels) on these scales 
at a n  ear ly s tage of the  decision process,  the  decision-maker is be t te r  prepared  to  
make consistent evaluations across  alternatives. However, w e  cannot expect  and 
should not requi re  full consistency in any judgmental decision process,  since not 
all relevant a t t r ibutes  might be  evaluated and the  relevant information on alterna- 
tives is never completely shared by all committee members. If each committee 
member is asked independently t o  specify his o r  h e r  aspiration and (or) reserva-  
tion levels f o r  each at t r ibute ,  a comparison of such resul ts  across  the  committee 
and across  at t r ibutes  serves  several  purposes: 
(a) t he  relative importance of each at t r ibute  f o r  each committee member and 
across  the  committee, as implied by the  more o r  less attainable levels, becomes ap- 
parent ,  as discussed below. 
(b) the  division of opinions among the  committee members can be discussed: if 
a significant subset of t he  committee has high aspirations (reservations) f o r  a n  at- 
t r ibute  and another  subset has  low aspirations (reservations), i t  is  a case  of a 
c lear  disagreement on decision principles. The committee might then discuss this  
disagreement and come t o  a consensus; o r  ag ree  t o  disagree by allowing the  forma- 
tion of coalitions tha t  rally f o r  the importance of various at t r ibutes  (for example, 
when deciding on siting a n  industrial facility, a p a r t  of the  the  committee might be  
more concerned with environmental impacts, another  more concerned with econom- 
ic impacts). 
(c) if the  discussion shows tha t  the reason f o r  disagreement s t e m s  from dif- 
fe ren t  perceptions by various committee members about the  exact  meaning of a 
particular a t t r ibute  and i ts  scale of evaluation, the  resul t  might be a be t te r  
specification of, o r  at least corrections in, the list of attributes.  
(d) if t he  committee (or a coalition inside the  committee) ag rees  t o  use aver- 
aged aspiration and (or) reservation levels, each committee member has a bet te r  
perception of the  anchor points t o  be used when evaluating alternatives. 
In o r d e r  t o  support these discussions, a number of indicators can be comput- 
ed. Denote t he  individually specified aspiration levels f o r  a t t r ibute  j by the  com- 
mittee member k by p ( j  , k ) and the  corresponding reservation levels by r ( j  , k ). 
Then the  committee "voting" procedure might specify an  averaging of individual in- 
puts, weighted by the  voting power coefficients as follows: 
Such an  average i s  subject t o  manipulations by committee members who have 
an  incentive t o  dis tor t  the i r  t rue  aspirations in o rde r  t o  influence the en t i re  com- 
mittee. A classical remedy, successfully used in subjective evaluations of cer tain 
spo r t  performances (e.g. ice-skating o r  ski-jumping) i s  t o  exclude outlying opin- 
ions, in this case deleting the  highest and the lowest p ( j  ,k ) o r  r ( j  , k )  across  al l  k 
before aggregating. This procedural option motivates committee members t o  s ta te  
the i r  preferences carefully since they will have no impact if they voice the  outly- 
ing opinions. If the  committee adopts this option (or  if i t  i s  imposed by the  commit- 
t e e  char te r ) ,  then a n  aggregation of opinions can be characterized by: 
where 
denote the  committee members with outlying aspiration levels who are therefore  
excluded from the  averaging. The calculations a r e  similar f o r  aggregation of 
reservation levels r ( j  ) and k ( r  , j ). 
2.2. Assessing disagreement 
The disagreement about aspiration (reservation) levels f o r  an  at t r ibute  among 
the  committee can be measured in various ways. Clustering algorithms can be  used 
in the  case of very la rge  numbers of committee members t o  identify t he  positional 
s t ruc ture  of the committee. Or, one could evaluate various statistical moments of 
the  distributions of p ( j  , k )  and r ( j  , k )  across  k , although moments of a distribu- 
tion do not typically indicate the  configuration of dissent. A good indicator of 
disagreement should distinguish between the  case when the re  a r e  two o r  more siz- 
able dissenting groups of committee members, each representing a uniform opin- 
ion, and the  case when the  differences of opinion a r e  distributed uniformly o r  at- 
tr ibuted mainly t o  outlying opinions. To identify these differences, a disagree- 
ment i n d i c a t o r  can be  defined in the  following way. 
First  l e t  us consider t he  absolute change of aspirations: 
where committee members are renumbered such that  
Now AP(j  ,k ) can be  split into t he  distribution of individual changes of opinion: 
In these equations, k can be  interpreted as t he  index of the  pairwise comparison 
between t w o  ranked committee members. If l a rge  differences occur  only at t h e  
ends of t h e  range  of k ,  corresponding to outlying opinions or small minority 
groups, they are not as significant as when they occur  in the  middle of the  range. 
To c o r r e c t  f o r  this, w e  introduce a coefficient c (k ): 
Other formulae can also be  used for this coefficient; t h e  above has  been 
selected a f t e r  empirical tests. The maximum value of c ( k )  f o r  any (K,k) is  one. 
Also ,  for all  K,c(k)  = 0 for both k = 1 and k =K-1 since outlying opinions are not 
counted in t he  aggregation. I t  i s  useful to define t he  disagreement indicator as:  
This disagreement indicator is  bounded by the  absolute difference of aspirations, 
AP(j  ,k ) ;  but D l @ ,  j ) = A P ( j  , k )  only if the  committee is  split into two equal f rac-  
tions of equal aspirations in each fraction. Note tha t  t he  disagreement indicator 
(5) has  a peculiar property:  i t  i s  always equal t o  zero  if K S 3. Clearly this is be- 
cause a committee of t h r e e  always has  two outlying opinions and only one will 
therefore  be  counted in t he  aggregation. 
Similarly, disagreement indicators D l  ( r  , j ) f o r  the  distribution of reservation 
levels A r  ( j  , k )  can be  computed. If both aspiration and reservat ion levels are 
used, t h e  committee might be  interested in disagreement indicators for averages,  
DI(pr ,  j ) ,  computed for t he  distribution of pr ( j  ,k ), defined as: 
I t  should be  s t ressed  tha t  t he  above indicators s e r v e  only t o  draw the  atten- 
tion of t h e  committee to t he  a t t r ibutes  and aspirations tha t  cause dissent, f o r  
which a discussion of differences of opinion might be  useful. Similar disagreement 
indicators can be  used when comparing the  differences between individual assess- 
ments of specific alternatives.  
Another type of indicator relates to t he  re lat ive importance of various at t r i -  
butes as implied by specified aspirations (reservations). Various types of indica- 
t o r s  can also be  used here .  W e  choose dominant  weight ing factors  implied by 
a s p i r a t i o n s  as relevant indicators because they are consistent with the  function 
used later for t h e  evaluation of alternatives.  
To be  consistent with our  theoretical decision model, t he  weighting fac tors  for  
a t t r ibutes  are constructed as follows: If a committee member specifies aspirations 
f o r  one a t t r ibu te  tha t  are "closer" to t h e  upper  end of i ts  evaluation scale than 
another ,  then this implies tha t  this a t t r ibu te  is  more important to him or h e r  than 
the  o ther .  More specifically, an  indicator should be  inversely proportional t o  
such a distance and, if t he  indicators are interpreted as weighting coefficients, 
they should be  normalized s o  that  they sum up to  one across all at t r ibutes .  To 
avoid computational e r r o r s ,  the  indicators should be  calculable even in such an  
unreasonable case tha t  a committee member specifies aspirations equal t o  t he  
upper end of the scale. Hence, w e  extend the  upper bound slightly, denoting i t  by 
u b ( j ) ,  and f o r  simplicity normalize all scales so  tha t  the  lower bounds of the  
scales of all  a t t r ibutes  are zero. Then the  dominant weighting fac tors  implied by 
aspiration levels p of at t r ibutes  j fo r  committee member k are computed as fol- 
lows: 
J 
w (P , j  = (ub  ( j  )/ (ub ( j )  - P ( j  .k I))/ (ub (?I/ (ub (7) -P ( j  .k))) (7 )  
J = l  
Weighting fac tors  implied by s tated reservation levels w ( r  , j ,k ) a r e  calculated 
similarly. 
These weighting fac tors  can also be  calculated f o r  the  committee's aggregated 
preferences.  In all  cases,  t he  indicators s e rve  only as feedback signals t o  indivi- 
duals o r  t o  the  committee t o  check whether the i r  aspirations correct ly  ref lect  
the i r  perception of t he  relative importance of various attributes.  If t h e r e  a r e  in- 
consistencies, they can easily be  corrected.  
2.3. Evaluat ing  alternatives by individual committee  members 
An essential p a r t  of t he  decision process  is an  individual assessment and 
analysis of all  alternatives by each committee member. In the approach followed in 
this  paper ,  i t  is  assumed tha t  t he  assessment is performed not by rankings o r  pair- 
wise comparisons but simply by assigning scores  f o r  each at t r ibute  t o  each alter- 
native (as a teacher  would assign grades f o r  each subject of learning t o  each pu- 
pil). Uncertainty in each assessment could be  expressed by supplying a range of 
scores  o r  a probability distribution fo r  the  scores;  however, we consider only the  
simpler case without individual assessment of uncertainty. The scores  of the  k-th 
committee member f o r  the  j-th at t r ibute  of the  i-th alternative a r e  denoted he re  
by q ( i . j , k ) .  
In o r d e r  fo r  each committee member t o  s ee  what the  scores  imply and check 
f o r  any scoring e r r o r s ,  rankings of alternatives by various at t r ibutes  can be pro- 
duced in the  system by listing the  alternatives. starting with the  best s co re  on a 
given at t r ibute  and ending with the  worst score.  However, the  committee member i s  
also interested in an  aggregate ranking which takes into account scores  on all  at- 
tr ibutes t o  test whether his o r  h e r  intuitive opinion about which alternatives are 
best i s  consistent with the  resul ts  of t he  scoring procedure. 
A special approximation of a utility function implied by aspiration levels is ap- 
plied in o r d e r  t o  produce such an  aggregate ranking; this  approximation is called 
an  (order-consistent) achievement function. 
Consider the  following question (Wierzbicki, 1986). Suppose the  user  knows 
the upper and lower bounds of a n  assessment scale and has specified a reservation 
and an  aspiration level fo r  each decision at t r ibute;  these four  points w e  denote 
respectively by Lb(j), u b ( j ) ,  r ( j )  and p ( j ) ,  where Lb(j) < r ( j )  < p ( j )  < u b ( j ) .  
Suppose a satisfaction (utility) value of zero i s  assigned t o  a n  alternative whose at- 
t r ibute  assignments are all  equal t o  reservation levels, and a satisfaction (utility) 
value of one t o  an  alternative whose at t r ibutes  a r e  all  equal t o  aspiration levels. 
We assume fu r the r  tha t  alternatives which have scores  satisfying all  the i r  reser -  
vation levels are pre fe r r ed  t o  any alternative which has at least one score  not 
satisfying the  corresponding reservation level. And similarly, alternatives which 
have scores  satisfying all the i r  aspiration levels a r e  prefer red  t o  any alternative 
which has at least one sco re  not satisfying the  corresponding aspiration level. Fi- 
nally, le t  an  (unlikely) alternative with scores  all equal t o  the lower bounds of the 
scales have the  value of d (a negative number) and an  (unlikely) alternative with 
scores  all equal t o  the upper bounds have the value of 1 + a (a number g rea t e r  
than one). What is the  simplest cardinal utility function (i.e. a function tha t  is in- 
dependent of all l inear transformations of t he  assessment scales) tha t  is consistent 
with all of these assumptions? 
The simplest function tha t  meets these requirements can be  constructed by us- 
ing linear approximations between the  points fo r  which i ts  values are known ( 4 ,  
0,  1 and 1 + a ) .  Such a function, called also an order-representing achievement 
function, has the  following form: 
where 
u j ( q ( i , j , k ) , p ( j ) , f ( j ) )  = 
and q ( i , k )  = ( q ( i , l , k )  ,..., q ( i . j , k )  ,..., q ( i , J , k ) )  is t he  vector  of scores  given by 
the  k-th committee member t o  the  i-th alternative. Thus the  achievement function 
maps a vector  of a t t r ibutes  into a scalar value f o r  each alternative. Additionally, 
p = (P (I) ,  . . . , p  ( j  ), . . . , p  (J)) and r =(r  (I) ,  . . . , r  ( j  ), . . . .r (J))  a r e  vectors  of aspiration 
and reservation levels aggregated across  the committee in a way tha t  is accept- 
able t o  all members. In i t s  middle range, the  function (8) can also be  interpreted by 
the difference between aspiration and reservation levels f o r  each at t r ibute .  
However, the  above achievement function has some disadvantages. Suppose 
the  scales of assessments f o r  all at t r ibutes  a r e  from 0 t o  10, and the  reservation 
levels are all 3 while t he  aspiration levels a r e  all 7. Compare two alternatives: 
one with all scores  equal t o  5 so  tha t  the  value of the  achievement function (8) 
equals 0.5, while t he  second alternative has scores  of 7 f o r  all at t r ibutes  but one. 
which has t he  sco re  4 s o  tha t  s (q , p  , r  ) = 0.25. But t he  second alternative might be  
considered bet ter :  the  be t t e r  achievements on many at t r ibutes  could compensate 
f o r  a worse achievement on one attribute.  In o r d e r  t o  co r r ec t  f o r  this considera- 
tion, we propose a modified form of the  function (8), called an order-approximating 
achievement function: 
J 
min u j ( q ( i , j , k ) , p ( j ) , f ( j ) )  + (E/J) u j ( q ( i . j . k ) , p ( j ) , f ( j ) )  + E )  
= I1*Y j =l I 
where uj (q ( i  , j ,k ) , p  ( j ) , r  ( j ) )  are defined as in (9). The parameter E in this func- 
tion represents  the  intensity of correction of the  worst (under-)achievement by 
the average (over-)achievement. In the example considered above, if E = 1 and 
the re  are 5 at t r ibutes ,  then the f i r s t  alternative has a value of the  achievement 
function (10) equal t o  0.5 (due t o  the  subdivision by 1 + E in ( lo) ,  this  does not 
depend on E if all uj are equal) but t he  second alternative has the  corresponding 
value of 0.55. So the  second alternative is p refer red .  If, however, E = 0.5, then 
the  f i r s t  alternative has an achievement value equal t o  0.5 but the second alterna- 
tive has an achievement value of 0.45, so  the  f i r s t  alternative is now prefer red .  
The choice of the  parameter  E is  left  t o  the  committee: if i ts  members feel  
tha t  the  worst achievement matters most, they should choose slight correct ion 
(say, E = 0.1); if they feel  tha t  the  average achievement matters most, they should 
choose very strong correct ion (say, E = 2), indicating tha t  average achievement is 
twice as important as worst achievement. A good interpretabili ty of t he  values of 
the  achievement function (10) by the  users  is obtained if a =b =1 and the  values of 
s ( q ( i  , k ) , p , r )  are multiplied by 10. Then the  achievement range is from -10 
(corresponding t o  al l  scores  equal to  0) through 0 (all scores  on reservation lev- 
els), through 10 (all scores  on aspiration levels) t o  20 (all scores  maximal, equal t o  
10). 
W e  should also mention h e r e  some mathematical interpretations of t he  dom- 
inant weighting fac tors  implied by aspiration o r  reservation levels in connection 
with achievement functions in the  forms (8) and (10). These achievement functions 
are nonlinear, hence the i r  derivatives (corresponding t o  t he  classical concept of a 
weighting factor  in a l inear utility function) depend on q ( i  ,k) .  In fact ,  these 
achievement functions are nondifferentiable, hence they do not possess deriva- 
tives in t he  classical sense at some points - and, in particular,  at the  anchor 
points, tha t  is, if q ( i  , k )  = r o r  q ( i  , k )  = p. The dominant weighting fac tors  indi- 
ca te  directions in t he  J-dimensional space of the  assessment vectors  q ( i  .k ), on 
which the  points of nondifferentiability are located. While these propert ies  of t he  
dominant weighting fac tors  are important mathematically, t he  r eade r  should 
remember two points: t he  dominant weighting fac tors  are not specified a prior i  o r  
supplied explicitly, r a t h e r  they are implied by the  choice of aspiration and/or of 
various at t r ibutes  as implied by aspiration and/or reservation levels. 
The achievement function (10) is used t o  aggregate scores  given by a commit- 
tee member t o  various at t r ibutes  of an  alternative and then t o  rank various al ter-  
natives according t o  the i r  achievement values. This can be  done when using e i ther  
individual aspirations (reservations) of a committee member o r  aggregated aspira- 
tions (reservations). In t he  former case, t he  ranking proposed by the  system 
serves  as a feedback t o  the committee member: he  o r  she  should compare i t  with 
his o r  h e r  intuitive perception of ranking of alternatives. If t he  ranking does not 
match his o r  h e r  intuitive perception, he o r  she  should check whether he did not 
make any e r r o r s  in scoring; another  reason f o r  such mismatch might be  his 
disagreement with the  correct ion coefficient E adopted by the  committee. If the  
ranking does match his o r  h e r  intuitive perception, he  o r  she  should be prepared 
t o  accept  the  f ac t  tha t  t he  ranking based on aggregated aspirations (reservations) 
might be different; but t he  committee member cannot protest  if he  o r  she  accepts  
t he  right of the  committee t o  impose aggregated decision principles on t h e  collec- 
tive group. 
2.4. Aggregating individual assessments across the committee 
There are various interpretations of t he  process of aggregating preferences 
across  a group of decision-makers. Typically, the interpretation is re lated t o  the  
concept of fairness; however, various paradoxes in decision theory (Saari, 1982) 
show tha t  t he re  is no absolute meaning in this  concept. In this paper ,  w e  simply re- 
quire  tha t  the  committee specify a set of procedures tha t  is accepted as f a i r  by 
the  group. For example, if t he  c h a r t e r  of the  committee specifies t he  voting power 
of each member, t he  procedurally "fair" aggregation is t o  take the  weighted aver- 
age of evaluations. The members with g rea t e r  voting power are supposedly e i ther  
more responsible (consider, say, t he  role  of t he  chairman of t he  committee), more 
concerned with the  outcome of t he  decision process,  o r  more knowledgeable in a 
cer tain substantive area. 
Hence, a final ranking of alternatives f o r  the  en t i re  committee can be pro- 
posed by the  decision support system by computing the  (weighted) averaged 
achievement values fo r  each alternative: 
with s ( q  ( i  ,k  ) , p  , r  ) defined a s  in (8) or (10). 
This aggregation procedure gives reliable resul ts  under cer ta in  assumptions, 
of which t w o  are m o s t  important. First ,  w e  assume that  committee members do  not 
bias the i r  opinions in o r d e r  to manipulate t he  outcome of t he  decision process.  In 
o rde r  to discourage such manipulations, it is advisable to exclude outlying opinions 
f r o m  t he  averaging process,  as w a s  done in (2) fo r  t h e  aggregation of aspiration 
levels: 
where 
& ( i )  = ar min s ( q ( i , k ) , p , r ) ;  c ( i )  = argmax s ( q ( i , k ) , p , r )  
l3rK lee 
Second, w e  assume tha t  committee members possess t h e  same information 
about alternatives.  This very demanding assumption is never  fully satisfied in 
pract ice .  The decision process  encourages discussion and exchange of information 
about alternatives between committee members in p a r t  by including concise 
descriptions of al ternat ives  and requiring agreement a t  cer ta in  stages.  When 
disagreement is indicated by major differences in individual rankings of alterna- 
tives or by la rge  values of t he  disagreement indicators, this  should tell t he  com- 
mittee to stop and search  for sources  of disagreement. If t he  disagreement is  due 
to a difference in t h e  information base between individuals, then t h e  problem can 
be  resolved by sharing and exchanging information. A graphic representat ion of 
t he  diverging scores f o r  an a t t r ibu te  of an  alternative helps greatly in such dis- 
cussions; a committee member with a dissenting opinion can e i ther  convince t he  
committee tha t  h e  or s h e  has  specific valuable information to sha re ,  or b e  con- 
vinced tha t  his or h e r  opinion cannot be substantiated. This se rves  as an  additional 
disincentive for attempting to manipulate t he  outcome of the decision process  by 
biasing assessments. The interested r eade r  should also consult Tversky et al.  
(1983) for discussions about biases in decision-making. 
After such discussion, t h e  committee can e i ther  decide to r e tu rn  t o  some ear- 
l i e r  s tage of the  decision process  (for example, to correct t he  scores)  or conclude 
the  process.  When adopting the  final decision (a ranking or a selection of alterna- 
tives) t h e  committee i s  by no means constrained by t h e  aggregate  ranking pro- 
posed by the  decision support  system, but merely guided by the  results.  
3. PROCEDURAL FRAldEWORK 
The above theoret ical  background of an  aspiration-led decision process  sug- 
gests a general  procedural  framework for the  committee; however, this  framework 
is  r a t h e r  elastic and can be  modified variously for any specific application. 
The f i rs t  p o i n t  on t h e  agenda is  to define t he  procedures  by which the  com- 
mittee will operate .  The questions addressed h e r e  should include the  following: 
(a) What is  t h e  expected product of t h e  committee's work and how does i t  in- 
fluence t he  appropr ia te  procedure? The answer to this question depends on the  
committee's c h a r t e r  and i ts  perceived role.  For example, if the  expected product 
is  a shor t  list of significantly different alternatives,  procedural ru les  will b e  dif- 
f e r en t  f r o m  the  case when t h e  expected product is  a consensus opinion on the  
"best" alternative.  
(b) What aggregation rules should be adopted, and in par t icular ,  should outly- 
ing opinions be included in o r  excluded from aggregation? 
(c) Should the  committee be allowed t o  divide and form coalitions tha t  might 
present separa te  assessments of aspirations, a t t r ibute  scores  and thus final rank- 
ings of alternatives? 
The committee should also become familiar with basic concepts concerning the  
use of t he  decision support system. A secre ta ry  o r  a designated committee member 
whose duties include working with the  decision support system should study 
thoroughly the  description of t he  system in the  user 's  manual (1985), and present  
t he  basic concepts t o  t he  en t i re  committee in t he  f i r s t  meeting. 
The second p o i n t  on the  agenda is problem specification. Neither the  list of 
alternatives,  nor  the i r  descriptions need be complete a t  this stage. The most im- 
portant p a r t  of this process tha t  requires  discussion and specification by the  en- 
t i r e  committee is t h e  definition of t he  at t r ibutes  of the decision and the i r  scales of 
assessment. 
Various studies in decision theory suggest tha t  a reasonable number of a t t r i -  
butes should not exceed seven t o  nine (see e.g. Dinkelbach, 1982); if more at t r i -  
butes are suggested, they should be  aggregated. For example, t h e r e  might be a 
l a rge  number of qualitative indicators tha t  are all  re lated t o  professional reputa- 
tion; instead of using all these indicators, i t  is be t t e r  t o  ask committee members t o  
evaluate subjectively the  at t r ibute  "reputation", tha t  is,  t o  t ranslate  the  informa- 
tion about all these indicators into one assessment, given originally on a verbal 
scale from "unacceptable" t o  "excellent", into a quantitative scale,  say from 0 t o  
10. 
A c l ea r  definition of relevant a t t r ibutes  is a very important p a r t  of the  deci- 
sion process. One possible approach is t o  f i r s t  list a la rge  number of a t t r ibutes ,  
then o r d e r  them into groups in a hierarchical s t ruc ture ,  and finally decide on a 
shor t  list of aggregated at t r ibutes  satisfying two requirements: 
(a) they should have the  same hierarchical importance - which does not mean 
tha t  they should be  equally important, but they should not obviously differ in im- 
portance nor  be hierarchically dependent; 
(b) they should not b e  highly correlated - that  is, two different a t t r ibutes  
should not express ,  under different names, the  same essential aspect  of the  deci- 
sion. 
Aggregated at t r ibutes  tha t  satisfy these requirements often have a qualitative 
charac te r .  A committee should avoid the  t r a p  of selecting some at t r ibutes  only be- 
cause they might be  quantitatively measurable (such as the  number of publications 
of candidates f o r  a scientific position). Typically, such at t r ibutes  are inadequate 
and are more relevant when expressed in aggregate terms. 
During t h e  t h i r d  p o i n t  on the  agenda, aspiration and/or reservation levels 
f o r  all  a t t r ibutes  a r e  determined separately by each committee member. After 
these values are entered into the  system, all necessary averages and o the r  indica- 
t o r s  (disagreement indicators, dominant weighting factors) can be computed. 
The f o u r t h  p o i n t  is  the analysis and discussion of aspirations by the  en t i re  
committee. These discussions a r e  supported by the  computed indicators and the i r  
graphic interpretations. 
In these discussions, t he  committee might address  t h e  following questions: 
(a) Do the  dominant weighting fac tors  accurately ref lect  the  perceptions of 
individual committee members about t he  relative importance of various at t r ibutes  
(if not, should the  aspirations o r  reservations be corrected)? 
(b) What a r e  the  relevant differences and do they represent  an essential 
disagreement about decision principles? 
(c) Does the en t i re  committee ag ree  t o  use joint, aggregated aspirations 
(reservations), o r  will t he re  be several  separa te  sub-group aggregations? 
The fiJYh point on the agenda is a survey of alternatives. Discussions might 
center  on the  following: 
(a) Are the  available descriptions of alternatives adequate f o r  judging them 
according t o  the accepted list of attributes? If the  answer i s  negative, additional 
information should be gathered by sending out questionnaires, consulting re- 
viewers, e tc .  
(b) Which of t he  available alternatives are i r relevant  and should be  deleted 
from the  list? This kind of cursory screening can be  done in various ways. The com- 
mittee might define some screening at t r ibutes  and reservation levels f o r  them (of a 
quantitative o r  simple logical structure):  f o r  example, w e  do not accept  candidates 
tha t  do not have at least four  years  of teaching experience. The sec re t a ry  can be  
empowered t o  p repa re  t he  l ist  of i r relevant  alternatives to  be  deleted; this list 
should be  presented t o  t he  en t i re  committee fo r  approval. I t  is  easy t o  overlook 
special opportunities related t o  seemingly i r relevant  alternatives.  
(c) Is  t he  list of relevant alternatives promising f o r  a reasonable choice? O r  
should the  committee look f o r  new alternatives? What a r e  the  at t r ibutes  tha t  have 
not been sufficiently w e l l  addressed by the  existing set of alternatives? 
Most of these questions a r e  analyzed subjectively without much support from 
the  system. However, the  list of relevant alternatives must be  sufficiently shor t  
before going t o  the  next point on the  agenda. 
Z'he sizth point  on the  agenda i s  t he  individual assessment of alternatives. 
The assignment of scores  fo r  each at t r ibute  t o  each alternative is t he  main input of 
committee members into the  system. Each member specifies scores; the  system 
supports this by displaying those assignments already made and those still t o  be 
entered. 
The seventh point on the  agenda is individual analysis of alternatives,  based 
on calculations of the  achievement function which lead to  a ranking of all alterna- 
tives fo r  each committee member. This ranking i s  the  main source of learning 
about the  distribution of alternatives relative t o  aspirations. 
The questions addressed by each member at this point might be as follows: 
(a) Do the  rankings along each at t r ibute  correct ly  represent  the  individual's 
evaluations of alternatives; does the achievement ranking, based on individual as- 
pirations, correct ly  represent  the  aggregate evaluation (if not, should the  scores  
be  modified)? 
(b) If t he re  remains disagreement about the  member's individual achievement 
ranking of alternatives suggested by the system, should he o r  she  propose at the 
next committee meeting t o  modify the parameter E tha t  expresses the  importance 
of average achievements as compared t o  t he  worst achievement? 
(c) If he  o r  she  agrees  with the  individual achievement ranking proposed by 
the system, what are the  differences between this ranking and tha t  based on indivi- 
dual scores  but related t o  committee-aggregated aspirations? A r e  these differen- 
cies significant, o r  can he  o r  she  accept  them as the resul t  of agreement on joint 
decision principles? 
Z'he eighth point  on the agenda is a committee discussion of the  essential 
differences in scoring and disagreements about the preliminary ranking of a l ter-  
natives aggregated across  the  committee. These discussions a r e  supported by the  
system; the  system computes indicators of differences of opinion and prepares  a 
preliminary aggregated ranking. 
The questions addressed by the  committee at this point might be  the  following: 
(a) On which at t r ibutes  are t he  largest  differences in scoring between commit- 
tee members observed? Do these differences represent  essential differences in 
information about t he  same alternative? 
(b) What i s  t he  essential information (or  uncertainty about such information) 
tha t  causes these differences? Should additional information be gathered, o r  can 
cer tain committee members supply this information? 
(c) Would the  resul ts  of these discussions and possible changes of scoring in- 
fluence the  preliminary aggregated ranking list proposed by the  system? This can 
be tested by applying simple sensitivity analyses. 
(d) Does the  preliminary ranking proposed by the  system cor rec t ly  represent  
prevalent committee preferences? If not, should the  parameter E be modified? 
A f t e r  these discussions, a r e tu rn  to any previous points on the  agenda is pos- 
sible. If the  committee decides tha t  the  decision problem has been sufficiently 
clarified, i t  can proceed t o  the final, ninth point on the  agenda: agreement on 
the  aggregated ranking o r  selection of one o r  more alternatives. I t  is  important t o  
stress again tha t  the  committee need not stick t o  the  ranking proposed by the  sys- 
tem, since the  purpose of this ranking - as well as of al l  information presented by 
the  system - i s  t o  clarify the  decision situation r a t h e r  than t o  prescr ibe  the  action 
tha t  should be  taken by the  committee. 
4. IMPLEMENTATION ASSUMPTIONS BND EXTENSIONS 
A prototype implementation of SCDAS on the  IBM-PC (or  compatible computer) 
i l lustrates t he  possibilities of the  system and s tresses  graphic presentations t o  en- 
su re  user-friendliness. 
This implementation in BASIC serves  actually only as an  illustration but con- 
tains a well-documented tutorial  example (of scientific recruitment committee 
work) and has a user 's  manual tha t  allows an  average user  t o  work with the  system 
on his o r  h e r  own problems. The implementation is limited in several  aspects: 
- only aspiration levels, not aspiration and reservation levels, a r e  used in t he  de- 
cision process and in t he  aggregating achievement function; 
- disagreement indicators a r e  computed only fo r  aspirations, not f o r  scores;  
- graphic illustrations, though quite r ich,  do not yet completely represent  informa- 
tion tha t  might be  useful at various stages of the  decision process. 
This implementation is available from A. Lewandowski at IIASA. Work on the 
next implementation - with much more professionally t rea ted  system details - is  in 
progress.  The new implementation is designed not only to overcome the  shortcom- 
ings listed above, but will also address  some new issues, such as representations of 
uncertainty in scoring, a joint data  base of information relevant t o  the  decision 
process  and reserved fields of the  data  base f o r  use by individual members. 
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